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Résumé 
Pendant la Première Guerre mondiale, les puissances occidentales étaient obligées 
d’utiliser toutes leurs ressources afin de vaincre. Dans les colonies allemandes, les 
troupes coloniales, la Schutztruppe, la plupart étant des Africains noirs, avaient la 
responsabilité de défendre les colonies contre tout envahisseur. Pour sa part, la France 
craignait, depuis la fin de la guerre franco-allemande, l’écart démographique vis-à-vis de 
l’Allemagne. Elle a finalement pris la décision de renforcer ses troupes par des soldats 
africains, les Tirailleurs sénégalais étant les plus nombreux. Ce mémoire vise à analyser 
et à comparer le recrutement et le déploiement dans les deux cas, particulièrement 
l’idéologie qui soutenait ce recrutement, les relations entre Africains et Européens 
pendant la guerre, la contribution des Africains à l’effort de guerre, ainsi que les 
conséquences de la visibilité accrue des Africains dans la société européenne. En général, 
nous pouvons remarquer d’importantes ressemblances entre les deux cas, en particulier le 
fait que l’utilisation de troupes coloniales a eu pour fonction de justifier leurs politiques 
coloniales et de condamner celles de leur adversaire.  
Mots clés: Tirailleurs, askari, France, Allemagne, Première guerre mondiale 
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Abstract 
During World War I, the Western powers were forced to deploy every resource 
available to prevail. In the German colonies, the defence was conducted by the 
Schutztruppe, the protectorate forces composed mainly by black Africans. France, for her 
part, feared the demographic imbalance with Germany and so decided to reinforce her 
forces with African troops, the Tirailleurs Sénégalais being the most numerous. The 
present thesis aims to analyze and compare the recruitment and deployment of both 
countries, particularly the ideology that buttressed each case, the relations between 
Africans and Europeans during the war, the contribution of Africans to the war effort, as 
well as the implications of the increased visibility of Africans in European society. 
Overall, it is possible to observe remarkable similarities between France and Germany, 
particularly the fact that their utilization of colonial troops served to justify their own 
colonial policies and to demonize the opponent’s.  
Keywords: Tirailleurs, askari, France, Germany, First World War 
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Introduction 
 
Among the most potent images of France during the Great War was the portrait of 
the uniformed Tirailleur Sénégalais, a colonial soldier with a friendly smile and ready to 
aid France in its time of need.
1
 As Richard S. Fogarty has argued, the image of black 
soldiers fighting alongside whites in Europe convinced the French that their mission 
civilisatrice to bring civilization to Africans was indeed bearing fruit. Moreover, the fact 
that African Americans fought in segregated units reassured the French of their moral 
superiority over the United States and of the positive role of colonialism. Thus, the role of 
Africans in the French war effort buttressed the image of the French colonial empire 
against its critics at home and abroad.
2
 
Eastward across the Rhine, in the newly-born German republic, defeat in the First 
World War provided a devastating blow to the morale of the armed forces.
3
 The 
Dolchstosslegende, the idea that the seemingly undefeatable German army had been 
betrayed by conspiring politicians, became widespread in the postwar years and served to 
discredit the republican regime. In the face of national humiliation after the armistice, the 
“forgotten front” of East Africa suddenly reappeared.4 The undefeated Schutztruppe led 
by General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck had surrendered only after receiving news of the 
armistice from Berlin. With a numerically inferior force, von Lettow-Vorbeck and his 
forces had consistently fended off the British, and had even managed to inflict substantial 
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losses on the enemy at the Battle of Tanga in 1914. Furthermore, according to 
Schutztruppe officers, most of the askari or native African soldiers did not desert and 
remained the key element in the successful German campaign.
5
 In March 1919, the 
German remnants of the Schutztruppe paraded through the streets of Berlin in their 
ragged campaign uniforms, and were warmly received by Berliners. The loss of 
Germany’s colonial possessions in the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles, German 
colonial apologists argued that the alleged loyalty and fighting proficiency of the askari 
demonstrated the benefits of German colonisation and a model to be imitated by other 
European powers.
6
 
However, this paternalistic image of Africans in Germany was soon forgotten 
when French West African troops stationed in the Rhineland in 1919 became the target 
for nationalist politicians who accused Africans of savagery and blamed France for 
“polluting the heart of Europe” with uncivilized soldiers. Africans were furthermore 
accused of rape and of cruelty during the occupation. These prejudices increased the 
discrimination and the isolation of the small African German minority, and during the 
Third Reich many Africans were sterilized and stripped of their civil rights.
7
 
Similarly, on the French side, the distinguished participation of Africans on the 
Western Front did not lead to an improvement in the overall status of Africans in the 
French Empire. Only a select few among the political elites in French Africa enjoyed 
political rights after the war, but discrimination continued. Africans remained in the eyes 
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of the French colonial authorities as simple-minded, brave but untrustworthy of any 
important duties or responsibilities. This same image of the child-like African was 
promoted in France through the use of racial caricatures that reminded the French public 
of the status of France as a colonial power and of the vast resources it possessed. 
Decades after the end of colonial rule in Africa, the discussion of the role of the 
Tirailleurs and the askari and the larger issues of the colonial legacy have been a matter 
of debate by scholars. While in France the debate about the colonial era has provoked a 
longstanding debate about colonial history, in Germany, the narrative of the victorious 
Von Lettow Vorbeck and his loyal askari has only recently been challenged by authors 
such as Winfried Speitkamp and Michael Pesek, who consider German resistance in East 
Africa as futile and disastrous to the African native population.  
 
Historiography 
Generally, the scholarly works pertaining to the present thesis can be divided into 
two basic categories. The first includes historians who have an overall positive view of 
the use of colonial troops by the French and the Germans during World War I, and who 
argue that conscription brought tangible benefits regarding military discipline and 
assimilation into European customs. In addition, these authors usually focus on the role of 
individuals such as Charles Mangin, Blaise Diagne and Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and on 
particular military engagements that helped to shape the myth of the loyal Africans 
valiantly led by tenacious European commanders. More recently, however, these views 
5 
 
have been challenged by more nuanced studies that delve into issues of identity, racism 
and downplay the heroic vision of the war. 
In From Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, Charles John Balesi subscribes to the 
former point of view, wherein the war effort was a success and brought France and its 
colonies closer.
8
 Furthermore, Balesi argues that Africans, as martial peoples, were 
naturally fitted to serve in the army. His work emphasizes the military accomplishments 
of African troops, and the acceptance they received in France during the war. On the 
other hand, Marc Michel’s Les Africains et la Grande Guerre, one of the most 
authoritative works pertaining to the use of colonial soldiers by France during World War 
I, provides a far more complex view of the subject. First of all, the mention of the 
Tirailleurs on the 11th of November, Veteran’s Day, when France remembers the 
sacrifices made by its soldiers, remains largely a token gesture. Furthermore, unlike 
Balesi, Michel focuses on the troops from the A.O.F. (Afrique occidentale française or 
French West Africa), since the A.E.F. (Afrique equatoriale française, French East Africa) 
provided mainly troops for the conquest of German colonies in Africa. Marc Michel’s 
work explores the extent to which the First World War changed the relationship between 
Africa and France and the French people, and the consequences of the Great War for 
Africans in the French colonies. In effect, the African participation was not limited to the 
military aspect, but also included an unprecedented economic contribution, which 
strained the resources of the A.O.F. On the military side, while voluntary enrolment did 
exist, forced recruitment and resistance on behalf of Africans provided the general pattern. 
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Most Africans resisted conscription, but in a variety of ways not limited to overt 
rebellion.
9
 
The war did change the perception of Africans by the French. No longer was there 
a political debate pertaining to the use of colonial troops, since it was now considered a 
reality. Furthermore, German right-wing propaganda of the “Black Shame” of having 
French troops occupying the Rhineland did not deter the French from employing colonial 
troops, and in fact might have reinforced the French self-image as the bearers of 
civilisation. Among the French people, the image of the “black savage” was replaced by 
the less offensive but still superficial caricature of the “good fez-wearing tirailleur.” 
In a similar vein, Richard S. Fogarty has argued that the use of colonial troops by 
the French during World War I involved a tension between French republican values and 
racial prejudice. In effect, while on the one hand colonial troops were considered a 
valuable asset in the Great War, they suffered institutionalized discrimination in the army. 
Despite a genuine commitment to the republican idea of equality by some French officers 
and politicians, such as the African delegate Blaise Diagne, that emphasized the shared 
brotherhood of Africans and native-born Frenchmen, in reality there were only limited 
advances in the acceptance of colonial soldiers as fellow comrades in arms. Fogarty also 
adds that the myth of the “Black Shame” wherein Germans accused the French of 
stationing “uncivilized” Africans on the Rhine was merely propaganda, which 
exaggerated the misconduct of a few individuals to denigrate French colonial troops.
10
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Regarding the German and British military effort during the war in East Africa, 
Charles Miller’s Battle for the Bundu  provides a highly readable, if romanticized, day-to-
day account of the conflict. In effect, Miller praises the role of Paul Emil Von Lettow-
Vorbeck, the commander of the Schutztruppe’s (Germany’s colonial troops) as vital to 
understanding the almost heroic German resistance in East Africa during the Great War. 
In this way, von Lettow-Vorbeck and his African troops provide a model of military 
efficiency and gallantry, as well as an example of the devotion to the Fatherland and the 
Kaiser. The fact that in 1964 the German republic agreed to assign back pay for the 
surviving askari ends Miller’s account on a high note, arguing that the sacrifice of the 
askari was rewarded in the end.
11
 
Furthermore, Miller suggests that it was the German combat experience against 
African rebellions such as the Maji Maji uprising that shaped the tactics in East Africa 
during the war. Rather than engage the British directly with a numerically inferior force, 
the Germans employed the guerrilla hit-and-run tactics that they themselves had suffered 
at the hands of the Wahehe in East Africa. Overall, Miller does provide a rather idealized 
vision of the German colonial period, which lavishes praise on German contributions to 
education and science in East Africa. However, while admitting that his account of the 
war is largely influenced by “literary license,” Miller also explains the effects of the war 
on the African population, criticizing the abuses committed by both Africans and 
Europeans in the Schutztruppe against civilians.
12
 This is a vital aspect, since more 
contemporary accounts of the war, such as Ross Anderson’s The Forgotten Front 
consciously focus solely on military operations. Nevertheless, Anderson’s work provides 
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a valuable contribution to the present project, since his study includes a brief comparison 
of the French, British, Belgian, Portuguese and German war efforts in Africa. In effect, 
the Schutztruppe and the Tirailleurs sénégalais compare favorably to their other 
European counterparts, in particular the Portuguese, which were often despised by the 
British as poorly trained and unreliable.
13
 
In regards to German colonial history, the available historiography depicts the 
colonial period as one of secondary importance for Germany. The work of Woodruff D. 
Smith and William Otto Henderson focuses instead on how the colonial period impacted 
future German claims over its former colonies and far-right nationalism.
14
 For instance, 
German nationalists argued that the loyalty of the askari to their colonial officers was a 
sign of the success of the German colonial enterprise, and therefore an argument in 
favour of returning German colonies after the war. Many authors of general works on 
African history such as J.D. Fage and Adu Boahen agree in fact that German colonies 
were the most efficient and profitable ones among all European powers, and Togoland is 
often cited as one of the few self-sufficient European colonies
15
. On the other hand, 
German historian Winfried Speitkamp questions this assessment, and argues that most 
German colonies represented a net loss for the German Empire, and required huge 
investments that were unfeasible at the time. Only limited improvements both in the 
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productive capacity and in the quality of life of the African population came only after 
1910 and the war made it impossible to determine their effectiveness.
16
 
Recently, the cultural aspect of the use of colonial troops during the war has 
become the subject of numerous studies in both Germany and France. The inauguration 
of the Tansaniapark monumentin Hamburg as a tribute to the German colonial forces 
sparked a heated debate in the German media about the pertinence of such a monument. 
In effect, columnists decried the fact that the monument emphasized the subordinate 
nature of Africans, since the sculptures were placed in such a way that made white 
Germans more prominent.
17
 Similarly, recent scholarly works by Jorg Lehmann, Michael 
Pesek and Susann Lewerenz have shed new light upon the German colonial period.
18
 
Pesek in particular is strongly critical of the “heroic” depiction of German colonial troops 
during the war, which only served to boost the morale of the German armed forces after 
the defeat, but ignored the atrocities committed by Germans in Africa, such as the Herero 
genocide and the brutal suppression of the Maji Maji revolt. Susann Lewerenz studies the 
fundamental contradiction at the heart of the “Black Shame” controversy. When French 
African troops were stationed to occupy the Rhineland after 1918, the German press 
reacted furiously at the alleged shame endured by the Germans by having “uncivilized” 
peoples on European soil. Lewerenz is quick to point out the fact that, on the one hand, 
the German press extolled the virtues of the black soldiers of the Schutztruppe as heroes, 
but on the other hand they had no compunction in depicting French Tirailleurs as savages. 
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This unresolved contradiction had a major influence in the relationship between Germany 
and its black minority. The few Germans of African origin remained in an ambiguous 
position, since the German Republic considered black Germans not as citizens, but as 
something akin to colonial subjects in a country that no longer possessed any colonies.  
Comparative studies of the war effort are relatively rare in the historiography of 
this subject. As mentioned before in the bibliographical section, comparisons between the 
war efforts in the colonies are limited in scope and do not constitute the central theme 
among the works consulted. For instance, Ross Anderson’s extensive chronicle of the war 
in East Africa compares the war effort of some of the opposing forces, such as the 
Portuguese, Belgian and British forces, but the focus of the book is the East African 
theatre.
19
 In addition, there is a certain gap between traditional military accounts of the 
war and more contemporary works that seek to assess the impact of the colonial period, 
upon both colonizers and colonized peoples. The purpose and the intended contribution 
of the present work will be therefore to bridge that gap by incorporating recent analyses, 
some of them from the postcolonial school, to complement the military history approach. 
Furthermore, a broader comparison of the overall French and German colonial experience 
will be necessary to understand the context in which the recruitment of native troops took 
place. For instance, the Herero genocide in German Southwest Africa arguably changed 
German policy towards native peoples, relaxing the harsh restrictions imposed on African 
peoples in order to gain some measure of cooperation.
20
 Events in metropolitan France 
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also guided colonial policies, as the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 
initiated a stronger push for native enlistment.
21
 
Issues to be considered 
The present thesis will analyze and compare the use of colonial troops by France 
and Germany during the First World War. More specifically, the focus will be on the 
reasons that led to the employment of Africans. Why during the heyday of scientific 
racism and colonialism did both French and German authorities resort to arming and 
recruiting native troops? How was this contradiction solved, if it ever was? Or did it 
manifest itself in particular forms of racism that never disappeared? Was this reflected in 
the tasks assigned to Africans during the war effort? In this sense, the present work will 
also consider the contemporary relevance of the subject in both German and French 
society, particularly given the high rates of immigration and the impact thereof. It is also 
interesting to ponder what kind of impact the use of African troops had on questions of 
identity and citizenship.
22
 The question of identity has been extensively studied on the 
French side in the seminal work of Marc Michel and more recently by Richard Fogarty, 
and on the German side by the collective work of Jürgen Zimmerer and Katy Heady, as 
well as numerous scholarly works from the postcolonial school of studies. 
Another major aspect of the present work will deal with the differences and 
similarities between both countries in regards to the use of Africans in the war. If there 
were any differences or similarities, what caused them? And can it be argued that one 
was more successful regarding the military aspect than the other? Is there a standard that 
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can be utilized to measure success? Furthermore, does the fact that Africans fought on 
European soil mean that the French were more tolerant about racial differences than the 
Germans?  And therefore, how did the colonial experience shape the use of native troops? 
On the African side, the attention will be focused on the experiences of Africans and how 
the war affected their perception of Europeans, as well as what kind of attachment, if any, 
did Africans feel towards their respective colonial powers.  
Hypotheses 
So far it is possible to argue that racist attitudes permeated the war effort on both 
sides. Both the Germans and the French undertook extensive studies in the colonies 
concerning the physical and “mental” characteristics of their African subjects, in order to 
determine the “fittest” recruits. Peoples considered too “primitive” or unruly were 
excluded from the outset. The language and the purpose of these studies are remarkably 
similar in both cases. Moreover, in the case of France, some authors such as Balesi argue 
that Africans in the French army were used as “cannon fodder” by their own commanders. 
On the German side, there seems to be a consensus regarding the porters, which suffered 
heavy casualties and were treated with contempt by German commanders. In general, 
however, the askari appear to have been a professional mercenary force, highly trained 
and valued by their commanders and in turn fiercely devoted to them.  
Concerning the comparison between both countries, at this stage it can be argued 
that one important difference stems from the very nature of German colonial rule, which 
confronted large-scale uprisings against the colonial order, such as the Maji Maji and 
Herero wars. As mentioned in the bibliographical analysis, the German colonial troops 
13 
 
had to adapt to new forms of warfare employed by Africans, such as guerrilla tactics, and, 
despite a brutal repression, many German officers were highly impressed by the 
effectiveness and flexibility of Africans.
23
 This grudging admiration later became the 
inspiration for the strategies employed in World War I, which combined with 
conventional training in the use of modern firearms. Therefore, it is interesting to note 
that there was at least one characteristic of their colonial subjects that the Germans 
aspired to learn from. On the French side, at least on the military aspect, the French 
limited the training of their colonial troops to European-style warfare, even when they 
were destined for deployment on African soil.
24
However, an important similarity between 
both sides centers on the fact that the war increased awareness of the presence of Africans 
in Europe. In effect, for the first time French and German citizens became more 
conscious of the extent of their respective colonial empires and saw Africans in a context 
other than the “colonial exhibitions” that had been common until then. This impact 
cannot be dismissed, since it had considerable repercussions throughout the 1930’s in 
both France and Germany.  
Finally, the present work will utilize the hypothesis that, despite the considerable 
war effort of Africans, their sacrifice went largely unrewarded, since racism continued to 
pervade French and German society to this day. It is true that there were some symbolical 
concessions. In France, the government recognized the wartime service of the Tirailleurs, 
but pensions were infrequently paid, and French citizenship was only given to very few 
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Africans, despite the lobbying efforts of Blaise Diagne.
25
  In Germany, back pay for the 
few surviving askari veterans was honored by the Bundestag only in 1964, while the 
askari that immigrated to Germany remained in an ambiguous legal status as “former 
colonial subjects,” less than full citizens. In this way, it is interesting to understand 
Africans’ attachment to the colonial power. In the case of France, it appears that at least 
in some cases there was a genuine belief in the defense of la patrie, despite the fact that 
most Tirailleurs were conscripts.
26
 In the case of the German askari, however, the 
attachment of the latter seems to have been to their commander rather than to the Kaiser 
or to the German nation as a whole, although Charles Miller claims that by the end of the 
war, the askari came to define themselves as German soldiers first and foremost.
27
 Later 
on, in both France and Germany, the war brought increased African migration to Europe, 
which triggered a whole new host of problems of integration and assimilation. In France, 
the role of Blaise Diagne was vital in pushing for equality, while in Germany, a number 
of associations pushed for equal rights during the Weimar Republic, and surviving askari 
even demanded recognition from the Third Reich.
28
 The question of Africans on 
European soil was politically manipulated by both the French and the German 
governments in the decades following the First World War, since they both tried to 
prevent their minorities from making “radical” demands, while providing some 
concessions.  
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Methodology 
The present work will focus mainly on the experiences of Africans, both from a 
military point of view as well as from the broader perspective of colonial relations. 
Therefore, when analyzing sources the focus has been particularly on those documents 
that inform on the relationship between Africans and Europeans, particularly comments 
from officers concerning the military conduct of Africans, as well as their daily 
interaction with African soldiers. Unfortunately, most of these sources, with some 
valuable exceptions, have been written by Europeans. Thus, whenever possible, these 
have been contrasted with oral sources that depict the African side of the war and African 
viewpoints of their offices. As with any other historical source, oral sources pose 
challenges of their own regarding the objectivity of the source material, Therefore, 
complementary sources, such as contemporary newspaper chronicles particularly from 
the British perspective, will be used to provide contrast with the German and French 
narratives.  
Sources 
First and foremost, archival sources will be essential to the present thesis, 
particularly the military archives of the Centre d’Histoire et d’études des troupes d’outre-
mer in Fréjus, the Service historique de la Défense in Paris, as well as those found at the 
Bundesarchiv branch offices in Berlin and in Freiburg. Documents consulted consist 
mainly of field journals of the East African campaign and the role of Africans on the 
Western Front. Other documents include casualty and decorations lists and medical 
16 
 
studies of Africans. Finally, documents and papers by military commanders as well as 
newspaper chronicles and articles about the war will also be analyzed.  
Other important primary sources will include autobiographies by the historical 
personalities who were decisive in shaping the history of native forces, such as Charles 
Mangin and Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, as well as ordinary soldiers’ accounts. The works 
of Bakary Kamian and Joe Lunn will be particularly useful, since they constitute some of 
the most important works of oral history about Africans in the First World War.  
Concerning secondary sources, as has been mentioned before, there is an 
abundance of accounts of the war from both the French and the German points of view. 
Scholarly articles will be utilized as a more in-depth analysis on specific points, such as 
issues of identity and historical memory. In addition, an understanding of the historical 
context will be necessary to adequately frame these oral sources. Therefore, the 
historiography of the colonial period will provide this historical background. Further 
complementary sources will include paintings and depictions of Africans during the war 
produced during the war itself, as well as marching songs and military traditions that 
could provide additional insight into the lives of Africans and Europeans during the 
campaign.  
At this stage it is possible to venture forth the working hypothesis that, despite the 
fact that the scope of the use of native troops by France and Germany was geographically 
different (since Germany did not intend to employ them on European soil), the 
consequences were similar. In effect, the use of native troops in World War I increased 
the visibility of African colonies. Postcards and accounts of Africans in European armies 
17 
 
were common during the war. Also, for the duration of the war, racial prejudices were put 
into question, since both the Germans and the French had to justify the arming of native 
Africans. This did not mean a long-term process towards assimilation or better integration, 
however, as improvements in the situation of Africans were minimal. Despite the fact that 
France remained a colonial power until the 1960’s, the memory of the role of Africans 
played in World War I remains as obscure in France as in Germany.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
1.1 The colonial context 
1.1.1 France: The aftermath of 1870 
 
By the nineteenth century, France had already acquired and lost an extensive 
colonial empire in North America and India. After the Treaty of Paris on May 30
th
 1814, 
Great Britain agreed to restore the colonial possessions that France had held in 1792. 
These mainly comprised the Antilles as well as French Guiana, the island of Bourbon in 
the Indian Ocean as well as some trading posts in India and Senegal. These territories 
became the basis for France’s second colonial empire. Among the factors that led France 
to seek to consolidate another colonial empire, national pride played a vital role. 
According to Denise Bouche, “[…] military glory was a positive value in post-
Napoleonic France and the Grande Nation found compensation overseas for the 
annihilation of its continental ambitions after the disasters of 1814-1815 and 1870-
1871.”29 In addition, French colonial policy was also guided by the mission civilisatrice, 
a profound belief that French rule could help “backward peoples” attain progress. Leroy-
Beaulieu’s De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes argued that colonization 
benefitted everyone, since it facilitated the circulation of goods, capital and people.
30
 This 
in turn enabled France to get rid of its surplus population while at the same time bringing 
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the gifts of science, reason and technology to backward peoples.
31
More explicitly, Prime 
Minister Jules Ferry argued in 1885 before the Chamber of Deputies that “There is a duty 
for the superior races to civilize the inferior ones.”32Moreover, an informal but highly 
influential “parti colonial” (colonial party) was strongly involved in pushing for 
colonization. It comprised three main organizations. The Comité de l’Afrique française, 
created in 1890, was a small organisation that brought together bankers, businessmen and 
intellectuals. It received financial support from the government and sponsored colonial 
expeditions. Its political counterpart was the colonial lobby in the Chamber of Deputies, 
which had a strong influence over the colonial ministry (ministère des Colonies). Finally, 
the Union Coloniale constituted the propaganda arm, with numerous publications under 
its control that extolled the virtues of French colonialism. This colonial party would have 
a close relationship with the most influential figures of French colonialism, such as Louis 
Faidherbe and more importantly for purposes of the present essay, Charles Mangin, the 
man behind the creation of the “Force Noire.”33 Some socialists such as Jean Jaurès even 
admitted their powerlessness to put a stop to French colonial designs. However, support 
for colonialism was hardly unanimous in French society and politics. Radicals such as 
Georges Clemenceau and most socialists were consistently opposed to it. 
From 1820 onwards, France tried to develop these existing colonies, but it also 
sought to extend its possessions whenever possible. By 1843, the French had also 
established fortified trading posts in Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire. In the case of Senegal, the 
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French initially tried to develop the trading posts of Saint Louis and Gorée, with little 
success. Under French governor Louis Faidherbe, French control expanded into the 
interior of Senegal between 1854 and 1865. In the Maghreb, French forces landed at 
Algiers in March 1830 on the pretext of an Algerian slight to the French consul and 
occupied the city soon after. The French gradually extended their control to the rest of 
Algeria, despite the fierce resistance of Abd el Kader and the region of Kabylie.  
Once again, the theme of French pride was vital to the conquest of Algeria. 
According to Bouche, King Charles X wished to rally French public opinion behind him 
and deflect criticism of his domestic policies. Even though he was soon after deposed and 
replaced by Louis-Philippe, his successor was also reluctant to begin his rule by giving 
away the first French conquest since 1814 and Algeria remained under French control. 
By 1843, the French had also established fortified trading posts in Gabon, and control 
was extended to the region called Oubangui-Chari (contemporary Central African 
Republic), and Chad. In the Congo region not claimed by the Belgian king Leopold II, 
the explorer Pierre Savorgnan de Brazza signed a treaty with Makoko, ruler of the Batéké 
peoples, which established a protectorate over the area in 1880.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the government of the Third Republic 
decided to reorganize its colonial possessions in order to rationalize their administration. 
By 1904, the West African colonies were unified in the Féderation de l’Afrique 
occidentale (French West Africa). The governor general was the highest authority in the 
federation, followed by lieutenant-governors, who were in charge of territorial 
subdivisions (Upper Senegal-Niger, French Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Dahomey, Mauritania, 
Niger and Upper Volta) and district commanders (commandants de cercle), in charge of 
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keeping a census of the colonial population as well as levying taxes. This elaborate 
hierarchy, however, could not function without the cooperation of local chiefs and also 
interpreters. As the next chapter will analyze, African authorities were vital to the 
creation and the recruitment of the Tirailleur battalions during the First World War. 
Indigenous authorities did see a substantial reduction in their powers after the last local 
uprisings were suppressed, and by the time of the outbreak of the Great War, the efforts 
to instruct French administrators in local languages had been haphazard.
34
 
The territories in Equatorial Africa were for their part unified in the Fédération de 
l’Afrique équatoriale française (French Equatorial Africa). They included as has been 
mentioned before the colonies established at Oubangui-Chari, Gabon, Chad and the 
French Congo. The capital was established at the city of Brazzaville on the shore of the 
Congo River. French Equatorial Africa was never economically important nor 
particularly prestigious as a destination for colonial authorities, and contributed less 
manpower to the French war effort during World War I than French West Africa. Bouche 
argues that “The country was very poor and sparsely populated […] Under-populated and 
poorly administered, French Equatorial Africa was a land of scandals.”35 
1.1.2 Germany: a late place in the sun 
 
Unlike other major colonial powers like Great Britain and France, Germany had 
entered the colonial race much later due to its own political developments. In effect, 
while some historians like Karlheinz Graudenz and Janos Riesz argue that earlier 
                                                          
34
 Bouche, 135. 
35
 Ibid., 136-137.  “Le pays était très pauvre et peu peuplé […] Sous peuplée, sous administrée, l’Afrique 
équatoriale française fut une terre de scandales. ” 
22 
 
Prussian efforts in the Americas constituted a precedent of German colonial experience,
36
 
these can hardly be compared to the vast colonial experience of France, which, as has 
already been mentioned, had possessed a vast colonial empire well before the Scramble 
for Africa. The fact remains that only after German unification in 1870 could 
colonization efforts begin in earnest. Even then, support for colonization was lukewarm 
at best. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck himself refused to support colonization efforts 
because he considered colonies to be both a risk in foreign relations and a financial 
gamble that he was unwilling to consider.
37
 However, he later changed his mind slightly, 
but rather than the strong state presence in the French colonies, Bismarck favored a 
model closer to that employed by the British at the beginning of their presence in India, 
through private companies backed by the state but limited to trading and investment 
rather than settlement, as in the French colonies. However, this limited approach was 
compromised from the outset by overzealous explorers and lobbyists, who eventually had 
to be backed up by the German government. Thus, according to Sebastian Conrad, “at no 
point was there ever one uniform view within Germany of the country’s colonial 
policies.”38On the one hand, German political parties never seemed to agree on the 
guiding principles of German colonialism. On the other, a fervently nationalist colonial 
lobby, gathered in the German Colonial Society, pushed for a bold colonial policy that 
could provide an outlet for German emigrants, in order to maintain their ties to the 
Fatherland, unlike German emigrants throughout the 19
th
 century in the Americas.  
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In 1884, a tobacco merchant named Adolf Lüderitz led the charge by establishing 
a trading company in southwest Africa (modern-day Namibia), but he soon ran into 
financial difficulties and was compelled to sell his assets to the German government, 
which promptly established the protectorate of German South-West Africa (Deutsch-
Südwestafrika) in 1884, the first German colony in Africa. Contrary to Bismarck’s 
designs, however, the German colonial governors sought to establish a settlement colony. 
Theodor Leutwein envisioned a grand scheme of German cattle ranchers and gradually 
adopted policies to displace native peoples. By the 1890’s, 70% of the land was in the 
hands of German settlers. This provoked major uprisings by the Herero and Namaqua 
peoples, which were brutally put down by the German colonial government. In time, 
German South-West Africa proved to be the costliest colony to maintain. 
Similarly, in Cameroon, another private agent paved the way for the establishment 
of a German colony, in this case the explorer Gustav Nachtigal. Sponsored by the 
Woermanns, a renowned trading family, Nachtigal signed a treaty with local chiefs in 
1884 and established a trading post at Douala in the coast of present day Cameroon. 
Unlike South-West Africa, however, German control was limited to the coast and left a 
large amount of autonomy to local authorities in the interior. German settlement was 
limited by a lack of interest and the presence of endemic diseases like malaria. 
Nonetheless, Governor Jesco von Puttkammer wished to establish a plantation economy, 
and his harsh policies soon provoked a political scandal that cost him his career.  
The protectorate of Togoland (Togo) was the rare exception that somewhat 
resembled Bismarck’s cautious approach. Nachtigal once again succeeded in signing a 
treaty with local chieftain Mlapa III, and the colony’s economy was mainly centered on 
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exports of palm oil and kernels. As in Cameroon, German control was concentrated on 
the coast, but Togo did not require major financial assistance for its upkeep.  
Finally, Deutsch-Ostafrika (German East Africa) largely followed in the footsteps 
of the other German colonies. This time it was Doctor Carl Peters, another explorer who 
signed contracts with local chiefs off the coast of modern Tanzania, and attempted to run 
them through his own company, the German East Africa Society. Again, this was the 
model favored by Bismarck, but the German government had to once again intervene, 
this time due to the constant conflict with the local population. By the 1890’s, the 
German authorities attempted to strengthen their control over the interior. Thus, Rwanda 
and Burundi were formally incorporated into German East Africa, but in reality, the 
rulers of both territories retained a large measure of autonomy. As in Southwest Africa, 
harsh exploitation policies sparked numerous colonial revolts. Already in 1888, Arab 
traders rebelled against the loss of their position as commercial intermediaries during the 
so-called Araberaufstand.
39
 But the major revolt against German colonial power took 
place between 1905 and 1908, the Maji Maji War. Utilizing hit-and-run tactics, Africans 
were able to keep the German forces at bay.
40
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1.2 The creation of African units 
1.2.1 France: the Tirailleurs Sénégalais 
 
 Traditionally, historians have attributed to Louis Faidherbe, governor of Senegal, 
the creation of the Tirailleurs Sénégalais, 
41
but according to Myron Echenberg, the 
antecedents of the Tirailleurs can be traced as far back as the seventeenth century.
42
 In 
effect, as has been mentioned in the previous section, at this time the French presence in 
Senegal was limited to small trading posts run by private companies. The French as well 
as the British began to employ local Africans as soldiers and sailors to augment European 
units and protect those trading enclaves. Recruitment during this period was limited to 
slaves. In 1819, the “rachat” system was introduced, which consisted of giving a 
premium to slave-owners who would in turn provide their slaves as manpower for a 
period of time between 12 and 14 years. In practice, it was essentially similar to the use 
of slaves and the “rachat” system clashed with the drive for abolitionism of the time. 
Thus, by 1848 and after the emancipation of slaves, the “rachat” was abolished and 
replaced with voluntary enlistment. However, few Africans were attracted to service in 
the military. According to Echenberg, the abusive recruitment policies of the past had 
caused Africans to see it as a degrading, as well as poorly remunerated, activity.
43
 A 
recruitment crisis ensued and the “rachat” was reinstated in order to fill the ranks. When 
Faidherbe became governor of Senegal in 1854, he established the first battalions of the 
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Tirailleurs Sénégalais in 1857, following a decree on the matter by the Emperor 
Napoleon III. While regulations and terms of service for Africans were the same as for 
Europeans, a crucial difference was that the wages of the former would be determined by 
the colonial authorities. Faidherbe also tried to establish new forms of recruitment that 
centered on attractive uniforms, limits on physical labor and enlistment bonuses. Even 
then, however, coercion was still the main source of manpower.  
In 1910, Charles Emmanuel Mangin, a lieutenant colonel from Lorraine, 
published La Force Noire, where he warned against the demographic decline of France, 
particularly when compared to Germany. Analyzing the demographic trends during the 
course of the 19
th
 century, Mangin argued that the French population was “[…] headed 
towards disappearance, and this decline, which has already begun, constitutes a real 
danger in the present state of matters in Europe.”44 Therefore, Mangin continues, until 
this problem is addressed, France must take advantage of its colonial empire and 
massively enlist black Africans. He then proceeds to chronicle the role of black soldiers 
throughout history, and argues that blacks are naturally suited for war. In his own words 
“the black is born a soldier even more than a warrior, for his military instruction is easy 
and he has a feeling for discipline.”45Therefore, he pushed for the creation of a reserve 
force, initially 10,000 strong and recruited mainly from French West Africa. Military 
service, however, would not entail political rights. As has been mentioned before, 
Mangin had influences in the colonial party, and gradually his ideas began to convince 
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metropolitan authorities. Together with a few like-minded colleagues, Mangin lead a 
mission to West Africa to study and identify the “races” that were most suitable for the 
“force noire” he envisioned. However, Mangin’s demands betrayed an “extraordinary 
ignorance” of local conditions.46 Local authorities like William Merlaud-Ponty, governor 
of French West Africa at the time, warned of disastrous consequences for the colony’s 
population and economy. In any case, Mangin’s initiatives would not result in massive 
conscription until the beginning of World War I. 
1.2.2 Germany: the Schutztruppe 
 
Unlike France, there was no systematic attempt to massively enlist Africans in the 
service of Germany, or to deploy them in a Europe theatre. As Charles Mangin argued, 
Germany far outnumbered the French demographically, so that justification was absent. 
Furthermore, the colonial troops were often neglected when compared to the other 
branches of the German armed forces like the army and the navy. Tanja Bührer has 
defined it as the “forgotten third military formation of the German Empire,”47  often 
incoherently regulated. As has been mentioned before, the initial colonial impulse in 
Germany came from private enterprises and businessmen. As was the case with the 
British and the French in the 17
th
 century, the Germans also created private militias 
(Privaten Gewaltorganisationen) to protect their investments.  
However, these private militias soon proved inadequate for the task of defending 
German colonial interests, particularly during the Araberaufstand. Therefore, the German 
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imperial government decided to replace the private militias with the Kaiserliche 
Schutztruppe, which can be roughly translated as “imperial protection troops.” The law 
regulating the creation of such a force, the Schutztruppengesetz, was passed by the 
Reichstag in February 1891 and thereafter the Schutztruppe was to be under the 
command of the German Imperial Navy.
48
At this time, it was composed mainly of 
Muslim Sudanese soldiers recruited from neighboring British East Africa, hence the term 
“askari” (Arabic for “soldier) utilized to designate black Africans under German 
command. However, as tensions with Great Britain increased, the Germans were forced 
to recruit the askari within their own colonies. As was the case with the French in the 19
th
 
century, the askari were essentially mercenaries, but, unlike French wages, those offered 
by Germany were considered attractive and the prospect of taking spoils from rival tribes 
as well as the prestige associated with the Schutztruppe provided far more incentives for 
Africans to enlist. Unlike Mangin’s appeals for a Force Noire, however, the askari 
remained a mercenary force.  
As with the French, German colonial authorities also made detailed studies on the 
differences between races. However, unlike the French, these constituted private 
observations recorded by officers in their field journals or specialized work by 
ethnographers and scientists. Nonetheless, the intent is remarkably similar in both cases: 
provide a classification of the different races inhabiting the colonies and find those 
suitable for war. For instance, General Georg Maercker in Unsere Schutztruppe in 
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Ostafrika singled out the Swahili-speaking peoples of the coast as particularly brave and 
ferocious during the Araberaufstand.
49
 
The East African Schutztruppe provided the model for the rest of the German 
colonies, but troop composition varied widely depending on the region. For example, on 
the eve of World War I, the Schutztruppe in German South West Africa was composed 
exclusively of 1,870 European soldiers. Due to the scale of the Herero and Nama 
uprisings and the colony’s segregated social order, Africans were considered particularly 
untrustworthy. This contrasts with Togoland, which, as has been mentioned before, was 
relatively peaceful and therefore the Schuztruppe comprised around 400 men, Africans 
and Europeans.
50
 Cameroon on the other hand counted around 200 white officers and 
1600 askari.
51
 As was the case with the Tirailleurs, the word askari became a generic term 
for all Black Africans under the German colours, regardless of their ethnic origin. This 
was probably not only out of tradition, but also probably to simplify designating them in 
field journals and other administrative tasks. 
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Chapter 2 
2.1 The setting: from Chemin des Dames to the Kilimanjaro 
 
Recruitment progressed slowly in the years before the war. As explained in the 
brief historical survey of the Tirailleurs, there was often a lack of volunteers, so Governor 
Merlaud-Ponty was forced to resort to partial conscription in 1912.
52
 Furthermore, there 
was a need for adaptation to African customs when Tirailleur battalions were 
concentrated outside of their colonies of origin. In this way, while Mangin had envisioned 
a professional army in the image of French metropolitan units, colonial authorities had to 
allow the Tirailleurs to bring wives and families along.
53
 This certainly clashed with the 
sense of uniformity that a modern army is supposed to establish, which provoked strong 
criticism from other sectors of the armed forces. Despite this, according to Michel, “[…] 
whatever the case, it is considered that this spared black soldiers from promiscuity and 
provided them with an almost village-like environment.”54 
The outbreak of World War I finally provided the supporters of the Force Noire 
with the chance to put their ideas into practice. However, in reality, West Africa was far 
from the reservoir that Mangin envisioned. At this time, the contingent of Africans 
consisted of approximately 30,000 men, half of which came from French West Africa and 
the other half unequally distributed between Equatorial Africa, Algeria, Morocco and 
Madagascar. In the words of Marc Michel, recruiting Africans to fight in a European war 
“[…] shows the profound ignorance of local realities on the part of those responsible at 
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the time.”55In effect, archival sources also confirm the ignorance of French authorities 
regarding the tensions in their colonies.
56
 While recruitment continued throughout 1914, 
there were multiple instances of resistance and evasion. By September 1915, a full-scale 
mutiny broke out in French West Africa, which was only contained with great difficulty. 
Thereafter, recruitment efforts fell onto Blaise Diagne, who managed to increase 
recruitment in the last years of the war by promising equality of rights to volunteers. His 
efforts were by all accounts successful,
57
and by the time of the armistice, the Tirailleurs 
Sénégalais numbered around 100,000 and were deployed along the German border.  In 
Europe, the Tirailleurs were engulfed in the horrors of the Western Front, but were also 
deployed in the Dardanelles and in the Balkans.
58
They served to reinforce numerous 
regular battalions and at times were merged into larger units when their losses were too 
high.  
Meanwhile, in the German colonies, German colonial governors were well aware 
of the weak strategic position of their respective territories. In effect, many German 
colonial possessions in Africa were surrounded by the Entente powers, in particular Togo 
and Cameroon. Thus, German civil authorities tried to follow a neutral policy in the war. 
The governor of Togoland, Major von Doering, suggested to the British and the French 
that neutrality was mutually advantageous on the basis of the economic interdependence 
of Europeans in West Africa.
59
 Similarly, in German East Africa, Governor Heinrich 
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Schnee wished to avoid war, since the memory of the costly Maji Maji uprising was still 
fresh and he preferred to concentrate on the colony’s economic development.60In addition, 
German settlers as well as missionaries also sided with the civil authorities, since they 
argued that war would disrupt their work in Africa. However, French and British troops 
rejected German requests for neutrality. Therefore, on August 5 1914, Togoland was 
attacked by Entente forces and the colony surrendered in only 20 days. The Entente’s 
objective was the wireless station of Kamina, Germany’s most important wireless station, 
which linked German colonies and trade. As has been mentioned before, owing to the 
pacified state of the colony, the Schutztruppe in Togoland was numerically small and 
posed no serious resistance. According to Strachan, Governor von Doering also 
intentionally conducted a half-hearted defence in accordance with his desire for 
neutrality.
61
 
Cameroon was a rather different case. Unlike German East Africa, Governor 
Ebermaier’s goal was to hold onto the colony as long as possible and protect Germany’s 
presence there.  To this end, Ebermaier was prepared to retreat into the interior, since, as 
has been mentioned before, only the coastal regions had been settled and explored. 
Consequently, knowledge of the terrain was crucial to the war effort. Unlike Togoland, 
however, the Entente offensive was spearheaded by the French. The British on their side 
concentrated on seizing the major ports and their first major offensive was repulsed with 
heavy casualties.
62
 Throughout 1915, however, British and French forces began to push 
inland utilizing the river network and finally Ebermaier retreated into the Spanish colony 
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of Muni (modern-day Equatorial Guinea) and surrendered on February 18 1916. For its 
part, Southwest Africa was a rather secondary theater of the war. An arid landscape 
(unlike other German colonies) and clear lines of movement along the railroads made for 
very different conditions from those in Cameroon and Togoland. Strachan summarizes 
well the nature of warfare in this particular region: “the South-West African campaign 
was characterized by a maximum of movement and a minimum of casualties.”63 Given its 
own unique history as the only German colony with a large settler population, the defense 
of the colony was almost entirely conducted by white German soldiers and settler 
commandos. In effect, archival sources make almost no mention of the role of natives 
during the war, except for the Colored (mixed-race), which were criticized for taking 
advantage of the war to settle scores with German settlers and murdering women and 
children.
64
 In any event, German forces could only pose a token resistance to South 
African troops led by Jan Smuts, and surrendered in July 1915.  
Finally, the war in German East Africa constitutes the main background for the 
present work. The colony saw the highest number of German askari take part in the First 
World War, alongside their white counterparts and officers. Their commander, Paul von 
Lettow-Vorbeck became a legend of German military genius, admired both by his men 
and his enemies. Unlike the Tirailleurs, this time Europeans had to adapt to African 
conditions. In effect, a war of movement like in South-West Africa was impossible, due 
to the densely forested landscape of East Africa. Furthermore, malaria was endemic to the 
area and was responsible for a large number of casualties.
65
 However, as with the rest of 
                                                          
63
 Ibid., 91.  
64
 Report on the South-West African campaign, R 1001 9564, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde. 
65
 Strachan, 124. 
34 
 
the German colonies, there was strong reluctance to enter the war among certain sections 
of the population. Von Lettow-Vorbeck himself acknowledged this in his memoirs: 
Could we […] prevent considerable numbers of the enemy from intervening in 
Europe? It is true however that I did not succeed in interesting all authorities in this idea 
[…] it must be admitted that in the case of a large number of Germans [in Dar-es-Salaam] 
(and even some of the local Government authorities) it actually did take some time before 
they were imbued with that warlike spirit without which the fulfillment of our task was 
simply impossible.
66
 
Encircled by the British Navy, Governor Schnee declared Dar-Es-Salaam an open 
city, while the Schutztruppe with Lettow-Vorbeck in command, retreated into the interior 
of the colony. At this time, the Schutztruppe numbered about 218 Europeans and 2542 
askari, and, according to Strachan it was “[…] a professional military elite, proud of their 
vocation and often the sons of soldiers.”67In November 1914, the British tried to land at 
Tanga, on the northern coast of the colony. Von Lettow-Vorbeck had anticipated the 
landing and prepared accordingly. On November 3
rd
 the landing was repulsed by the 
Schutztruppe in the first major German victory in the war. A confident Lettow-Vorbeck 
decided therefore to attack Jassin, a British-occupied village in the border with British 
East Africa in January 1915. Although successful, the attack resulted in heavy casualties 
among German officers, which Lettow-Vorbeck could hardly afford. Furthermore, the 
general learned of the fall of German South-west Africa, which would enable South 
African forces to join the British. Thus, from the end of 1915 to 1918 the Germans were 
forced to resort to guerrilla warfare, attacking strategic enemy positions and establishing 
their headquarters in the areas were they could get supplies. When the Belgians entered 
the war from the west of the colony,the Schutztruppe was gradually forced to retreat 
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further south until, in 1917, they crossed the Rovuma River into Portuguese East Africa 
(Mozambique). Even then they fought on until they learned the news of the armistice 
from Europe.  
 
2.2 The soldiers: conflict and accommodation 
 
In general, it can safely be said that the Tirailleurs Sénégalais performed as well 
as their European counterparts. Most reports praise their extraordinary courage, 
particularly during specific engagements such as the defense of the Yser at the outbreak 
of the war, Chemin des Dames, the Nivelle offensive and the battle of Verdun. A decision 
by the government and signed by Georges Clemenceau in 1919 conferred the Croix de 
Guerre as well as the fourragère to the Tirailleur battalions in honour of the “particularly 
brilliant way” in which the Tirailleurs conducted themselves during the war.68 Criticisms 
that the Tirailleurs were cowardly and ran away at the sight of gas attacks of charging 
German infantry come mostly from English commanders.
69
Insufficient preparation and 
poor leadership, particularly in the case of Chemin des Dames and the failed Nivelle 
offensive (which sparked a large-scale mutiny in 1917) seem to be the main causes for 
the poor results, which include not only the Tirailleurs but also the French army in 
general.  
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On the German side, there seems to be a consensus between primary sources and 
specialized works on the good performance of the askari and their overall loyalty. Thus, a 
report after the battle of Tanga simply attests that “the conduct of our troops, as well as 
the coloured ones,
70
 was excellent.”71Another report by Lieutenant Popper on the 8th of 
November added that “The conduct of the company askari, who today fought for the first 
time, was excellent, despite encountering numerically superior opponents.”72For his part, 
Governor Schnee commented after the battle of Mahiwa“[…] this battle was, alongside 
Tanga, the greatest engagement in the whole war. During the battle, not only did the 
Germans display an outstanding valour, but also the askari fought equally 
brilliantly.”73Schnee also mentions that many askari had not fought against Europeans 
before, and therefore their performance was unexpectedly good.
74
 Interestingly, as with 
the French with the Bambara, the Wanjwamwezi seem to have been the favored ethnicity 
by the Germans, since there are numerous specific references to them and their bravery. 
75
Finally, Schnee also makes a rather interesting point about the pacification of East 
Africa, since he argues that no major uprising took place in the colony since 1905, where 
there were only 6000 Germans surrounded by 8 million Africans. According to Schnee, 
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this proves the loyalty of both the askari and the African subjects.
76
 However, given both 
the wide intertribal scope of the Maji Maji uprising, unheard of in German colonies at the 
time, and its violent suppression, it is unlikely that any other rebellion could have been as 
coordinated. Furthermore, Schnee’s whole argument tries to make the case that German 
colonial policies were benign and that therefore Germany should not have lost its 
colonies. This was quite common at the time the document was written, since both the 
British and the French pushed for the creation of protectorates over the former German 
colonies due to the “ineptitude” of the Germans to properly develop them.   
In an interview conducted years after the war, von Lettow-Vorbeck himself added 
that “[…] our men, even the black “askaris” […] felt the simple duty to help the German 
Emperor and continued fighting therefore […],” 77  despite acknowledging that some 
askari eventually deserted. In his memoirs, Lettow-Vorbeck also had great praise for the 
conduct of the askari. At Engito Mountain he commented: “although the enemy consisted 
of English and Boer farmers, who were therefore good horsemen and good shots, our 
Askari attacked them with the bayonet with such dash, that out of a strength of eighty 
Europeans some twenty dead were left behind.”78 Furthermore, he also emphasized the 
askari’s chivalrous conducts vis-à-vis prisoners of war: “our Askari earned the respect of 
the enemy by their bravery in action and their humane conduct. On the 10
th
 March the 
English lieutenant Barrett was severely wounded and fell into our hands […] he was 
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surprised when our Askari, who had no European with them, tied him up […] and carried 
him to a doctor.”79 
The use of native troops by both France and Germany was marked from the outset 
by a tension between the rigid structure of European armed forces and the necessary 
adaptation to both African soldiers and, in the case of Germany, the African landscape 
itself. In the case of the Schutztruppe, officers had to adjust their recruitment tactics as 
well as their regimental regulations and their tactics to the particular conditions of East 
Africa and Cameroon.  
On the French side, while Africans certainly had to adapt to European warfare on 
the Western Front, French commanders also had to be flexible enough to accommodate 
the Tirailleurs. First and foremost, African troops were unfamiliar with the climate of 
northern France and suffered terribly because of the cold and the inadequate trenches.
80
 
Therefore, during the harshest months of winter, they were taken to summer camps in the 
south of France, particularly in the region of Fréjus and Saint-Raphael. This appears to 
have been a fairly extended practice, as the journal of Corporal Marcel Cau attests. When 
commenting on his meeting with some Tirailleur companies, Cau mentioned that other 
French soldiers were used to seeing the Tirailleurs leave during the coldest months of the 
year.
81
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 Archival sources also reveal a number of recommendations and special 
considerations that the French army had to take into account when employing African 
units. For example, a 1930 document by General Rueff listed many of the insights that 
the French military learned during World War I regarding their African soldiers. The 
document begins by asserting that “The Tirailleur is a “soldier” in the full sense of the 
word. Well employed he will perform as well as any other unit, even a European one, 
under any circumstance.”82 This reinforces the assertion that, in terms of military prowess, 
Senegalese troops generally performed well during World War I. Part II again noted the 
extreme sensitivity of Senegalese troops to the cold. Therefore, special precautions 
against respiratory illnesses had to be taken, including adequate clothing and 
discouraging certain conducts ascribed to the Senegalese, such as washing themselves 
with cold water.
83
 Dietary considerations were also vital, since the French learned they 
had to adapt the rations to the Senegalese’s constitution. “The Senegalese, a big eater, 
loves to feel a full belly” Rueff continues, “[…] well prepared rice gives him a feeling of 
satisfaction that no other food can provide in equal measure.”84 Furthermore, Rueff also 
noted the importance of having a proper supply of Kola nuts, a staple of West African 
peoples.
85
Even then, however, Rueff advised against maintaining the Senegalese custom 
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of eating a large meal once a day, and instead recommended that Senegalese soldiers be 
compelled to adapt to the customary three daily meals.
86
 
Adaptation to African soldiers and conditions was even more pronounced in the 
case of the Schutztruppe. In effect, the askari were not only allowed to bring their 
families along, but in the same way as European soldiers, they were permitted a number 
of personal servants called “boys.”87The number of porters allowed increased depending 
on the rank of the askari.
88
 Moreover, German military regulations included provisions 
for religious holidays in the case of Muslim askari.
89
 Military regulations encouraged 
gaining the confidence of elders or members of African elites enrolled in the 
Schutztruppe, since this was considered essential for maintaining discipline. Therefore, 
whites were encouraged to be patient with elders and not to insult or otherwise demean 
them, as well as to engage in occasional gestures of friendship.
90
In addition, German 
officers also tolerated practices that they personally disliked, such as taking clothes from 
the dead on the battlefield and pillaging. Upon seeing his askari take clothing from a dead 
Indian soldier, a German officer remarked “With our Blacks one had to even think and 
feel an African in this campaign.”91 
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Interspersed with these accomodations, however, other measures sought to 
regulate African life according to European standards. Section 2 b.2 of the same military 
regulations prohibited slavery among the askari and encouraged askari to have a “legal” 
wife (rechtmäßige Frau).
92
 Other regulations granted a bonus on the birthday of the 
Kaiser,
93
 possibly another step to remind the askari of their belonging to the German 
Empire.  
But the very structure of the Schutztruppe reflected African conditions. As 
explained in Chapter 1, German colonial troops encountered stiff resistance during the 
Maji Maji war. Slow-moving German divisions proved an easy target for the insurgents’ 
hit-and-run tactics. When the revolt was brutally crushed, German commanders modified 
the Shuctztruppe’s tactics accordingly. Small and tactically autonomous companies 
became the norm, and this flexibility proved crucial in the dense jungles of East Africa, 
where complex tactical manoeuvres were largely ineffective.  
 However, despite these efforts at adapting European regulations, there was also a 
clear feeling of racial superiority towards Africans. For instance, in the case of France, 
from the sources analyzed, the Tirailleurs were not considered capable of taking the 
initiative during combat operations. They could perform well, but only as long as they 
were properly employed, which in practice meant that they had to be guided by European 
officers. Rueff adds that “[…] every elementary precaution that a White will instinctively 
take will require an order for a Black to do likewise.”94 Echoing Rueff’s assertions is the 
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valuable testimony of Second Lieutenant Charles N’Tchoréré, one of the few Tirailleurs 
to attain officer rank. In his report on the conduct of the Tirailleurs, N’Tchoréré praised 
the valour of his fellow Africans, but emphasized that “The Tirailleur, as we have already 
said, is a big child, often an unconscious enemy of his most direct interests. His superior, 
as a father to a child, must illuminate, guide and even force him towards his interests, 
which almost always correspond to those of Military Duty!”95 Another notice on the role 
of the Tirailleurs adds that “[…] in general, the Black is rough, credulous, proud, vain; he 
loves speeches and is easily influenced by good speakers, storytellers […] he easily falls 
into a dumb stubbornness when he believes he is insulted or a victim of an injustice.”96 
Similarly, German officers considered black soldiers intellectually inferior to 
whites. A German officer, Moritz Freiherr von Lyncker wrote in his memoirs that 
“Naturally, the Black is never to be compared to a European.”97Another officer, Captain 
von Hammerstein, asked himself whether blacks were reliable, and answered “it cannot 
be said. How the black thinks has not been discovered. The black is very 
impulsive.”98Also, German military regulations assigned less food supplies to Africans, 
and of a lesser variety. Thus, besides meat and fish, Europeans were entitled to receive 
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honey, jam, noodles and different kinds of liquor, while Africans were limited to “native” 
food, like cornmeal and other types of flour, as well as beans and meat.
99
 
In addition, the standard-issue field rifle for the askari was slow and outdated and 
produced a lot of smoke upon firing, due to the mistrust towards natives among German 
officers.  There were also separate ranks for the askari, to ensure that they could not rise 
above a certain position within the Schutztruppe.  
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Chapter 3 
3.1 Memory and the manipulation of the role of Africans after the war 
 
After the war, both the French and the German authorities utilized the memory of 
African combatants to fulfill specific political goals, in particular the success of their 
respective colonial projects. In the case of France, this meant first of all demonstrating 
that the resources of the French empire were limitless and that France could successfully 
call upon its colonial troops in case of war. The war had effectively demonstrated that 
Africans could perform well in combat. But more importantly, after the end of World 
War I, French government officials promoted the view that the use of Africans proved 
France`s commitment to the republican ideals of fraternity and equality.
100
In the postwar 
years, the French government celebrated this particular vision by erecting numerous 
memorials and monuments to the Tirailleurs.
101
However, despite the promises made by 
Blaise Diagne during the war, there was little improvement in the conditions of Africans, 
both in the colonies and in metropolitan France. In 1920, Diagne, re-elected as deputy for 
Senegal, led a campaign to extend citizenship to African veterans, but was thwarted by 
more conservative officials, who feared unrest.
102
Furthermore, very few Africans were 
promoted to the officer corps, since French officials did not want blacks leading whites. 
To this end, the French government created elite military schools such as the École  
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Spéciale des Sous-Officiers Indigènes at Fréjus. Only a select few, like Captain Charles 
N’Tchoréré managed to attain an officer’s rank.103 Finally, the 1919 Conscription Law 
formalized conscription in French West Africa, and established quotas for each 
administrative division. Males would be chosen through a lottery system. These lists 
however, were based on demographic surveys of dubious accuracy. According to 
Echenberg, the methods used were “slipshod” and “pseudoscientific” 104  and did not 
reflect the actual demographic capabilities of the colonies. Therefore, a large gap 
remained between the promises made before and during the war and the actual change in 
the colonial policies.  
In the case of Germany, the historical narrative that developed after the war aimed 
to present the Germans as ideal colonizers. After the armistice, the East African 
Schutztruppe and von Lettow-Vorbeck were hailed as heroes, since they only surrendered 
after learning of the armistice.  The Entente powers responded by deploring what they 
saw as the excesses of German colonialism. As part of the Treaty of Versailles, all of the 
German colonies passed on to the hands of other colonial powers, since the peacemakers 
at Versailles considered that German colonial rule had been a failure. For instance, the 
American expert on the subject at Versailles argued that “The native was almost 
universally looked upon as a means to an end […] his welfare and that of the colony 
completely subordinated to the interests of the German on the spot and of Germany at a 
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distance.” 105 The British had already been criticizing German rule as a means of 
undermining the morale of natives. A propaganda message intended for the askari on 
January 1
st
 1918 accused the Germans of cowardice and of lying about payment for 
askari service. The message was also written in Swahili and offered the askari peace and 
a return to their homes in exchange for their desertion.
106
 Moreover, in the British press, 
the September 22 1921 edition of the Times Literary Supplement “The East African Force” 
reported that many natives were discontented with German rule and joined the British 
army whenever possible.
107
 The Westminster Gazette on the other hand had a headline 
that ran “German Brutality in East Africa” and directly accused the German army of 
starving and mistreating Africans.
108
 Furthermore, the review “African World,” despite 
praising the military qualities of von Lettow-Vorbeck, criticized the lack of German 
“scruples” that led the latter to take supplies from the native. In what appears to be an 
affirmation of the higher moral nature of British colonial policies, the article emphasized 
that “the strict regulations which prohibited the commandeering of native supplies and 
insisted on exact payment for everything brought in made the task of the British even 
harder, for, of course, the Germans were hampered by no such scruples.” 109Finally, 
General Jan Smuts, who had fought against von Lettow-Vorbeck, argued that only White 
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South Africans properly understood natives, and thus South Africa should administer 
German Southwest Africa.
110
 
In response to these accusations, German historians and journalists of the time 
considered the backlash against German rule as a “Kolonialschuldlüge,” a “guilt lie” that 
unfairly placed the blame on Germany for violence against native Africans. The 
defenders of German colonial rule expressed the conservative values of the fallen 
imperial regime, particularly militarism and duty, in contrast to the emerging horrors of 
Communism and the uncertainties of democracy. In the German press, numerous articles 
hailed the role of the askari and their commander. For example, on March 31 1919, the 
Herforder Zeitung commented on the bravery of the Schutztruppe and the overall role of 
Germans in “liberating” native peoples.111 Similarly, the Chemnitzer Tageblatt, in its 
edition of August 25 1921, praised the courage of von Lettow-Vorbeck and the askari and 
contrasted their valour to the sailors who took part in the Kiel mutiny: “at the time when 
the Kiel sailors mutinied cowardly and stabbed the Fatherland in the back, the black 
askari told their commander: ‘Sir, we remain at your side until we fall!’.” 112 Even 
contemporary authors such as J.D. Fage have depicted German colonialism as largely 
positive: “By 1914 it would not be unreasonable to say that German colonial 
administration was earning the respect and admiration, if not the love, of the African 
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peoples subjected to it. But there was no time to see how the new German colonial 
policies might work out.”113 
For his part, the deeply conservative von Lettow-Vorbeck was among the 
staunchest defenders of German colonial rule. In his campaign journal he accused the 
British of coveting German East Africa and emphasized the fact that, while the askari 
were certainly intelligent, they recognized their “backwardness” when compared to 
Europeans and acknowledged the progress made so far by the Germans in Africa.
114
 
Furthermore, he yearned for a return to the traditional German values that seemed to have 
been lost in defeat. He concluded his memoirs on the East African campaign by arguing:  
I believe that it the transparency of our aims, the love of our Fatherland and the 
strong sense of duty and the spirit of self-sacrifice which animated each of our Europeans 
and communicated themselves […] to our brave black soldiers that gave our operations 
the impetus which they possessed to the end. If we East Africans received so kindly a 
reception in the homeland it was because everyone seemed to think that we had preserved 
some part of Germany’s soldierly traditions and that the Teutonic sense of loyalty 
peculiar to us Germans had kept its head high even under the conditions of war in the 
tropics.
115
 
To this end, in 1928 he joined the Deutschenationale Volkspartei (German 
National Peoples’ Party) or DNVP. A deeply conservative and anti-Semitic party, the 
DNVP’s platform called for the return of the former German colonies, the restoration of 
the monarchy, the strengthening of the Reichswehr and the struggle against “the 
hegemony of Jewry” and this strongly resonated with von Lettow-Vorbeck.116 Thereafter, 
in numerous articles and public apparitions after the war, he continued to defend German 
colonialism and to attack the hypocrisy of the Entente powers. By the end of the 1920’s, 
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he had become convinced that Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist Party was the only 
political force that “will not abandon Germany’s rightful colonies.”117Consequently, as 
the Nazis gradually gained power, von Lettow-Vorbeck seized the occasion to put right 
what he saw as a critical issue in colonial matters: the backpay due to the askari after the 
war. As mentioned before, what set the askari apart from other Africans in the German 
colonies was the comparatively high wages that they earned and that, in time, 
transformed them into a pseudo native urban “elite.” Therefore, the standing of the askari 
was highly dependent on their wealth, which is why, according to Uwe Schulte-
Varendorff, the German government could ill afford to alienate their native allies and 
give credit to the “Kolonialschuldlüge.”Thus, von Lettow-Vorbeck’s efforts within the 
German government to settle the debt to the askari were vital, since “In the hopes of one 
day regaining its colonies, it was necessary to leave a positive image among Africans.”118 
 
3.2 The “Black Shame” controversy 
 
Both the French and the German narratives on the ideal colonial project clashed 
during the episode called the “Black Shame.” In 1917, near the end of the war, the 
German Colonial Office as well as the press began to criticize the French for the use of 
“savage” black troops on European soil. 119 Africans were accused of beheading 
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surrendering German troops with their large combat knives, the “coupe-coupe.”120 But 
these charges grew particularly virulent after the armistice and during the occupation of 
the Rhineland by French troops. Now, Africans were accused of raping German women 
and thus attempting to “contaminate” German blood. For its part, the German press 
accused the French government of attempting to humiliate the German people by 
occupying the Rhineland with black soldiers, previously no more than colonial subjects 
and subordinated to Europeans. In numerous German magazines and posters of the time, 
Africans were portrayed as monstrous, with ape-like features and sexually voracious. 
Coins were minted mocking the French motto “liberté, égalité, fraternité” with an image 
of a snarling black soldier. The French countered by accusing the Germans of racism and 
by extolling the loyalty of Africans towards France, the “bearer of civilization in 
Africa.”121Furthermore, the French argued that Africans were considered “comrades in 
arms,” not wild beasts, and that the Germans were contradicting themselves by, on the 
one hand, praising the askari and, on the other, by their blatant racism against the 
Tirailleurs.
122
 How then did the Germans reconcile this apparent contradiction? 
According to Erich Duems, a writer in the Deutsche Kolonialzeitung, the purpose of the 
Schutztruppe was to protect German colonies, but never to be deployed in Europe. In 
addition, segregation of Africans was logical.  
It is thus not for disdain for alien races, but on the contrary our high esteem for 
the principle of racial purity, that prompts us to ensure that the naturally given borders 
between races are not blurred; especially the native from the African colonies 
understands this, because he despises those whites who deny the prerogative of their 
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blood and color. The high esteem that the Germans have among the natives of our 
colonies and their inextinguishable loyalty to us is based not least on this racial 
consciousness, which preserves the distinctive ethnic character of both the colonizing 
nation and the natives. 
123
 
Once again, this claim defends the German colonial project against the 
miscegenation resulting of French policies. In reality racism was a part of both societies, 
as well as limited integration. The next section will focus on the experience of colonial 
soldiers in their contacts with Europeans during and after the war. In the aftermath of the 
“Black Shame” controversy, the French withdrew most of their African troops from the 
areas under occupation, but the image of the African as a savage would prove enduring 
among the German right. Hitler would mention the Black Shame as an attempt of world 
Jewry to subjugate Germany, and Tirailleur prisoners of war during World War II would 
be harshly mistreated. 
3.3 Soldiers’ memories and their impact on French and German society 
 
However, despite the official narratives that each side tried to present, the reality 
of African soldiers in both countries was far more complex. For instance, the day-to-day 
lives of the Tirailleurs in the French army brought them into close contact with their 
fellow comrades in arms in what Deroo calls the “camaraderie des tranchées.”124 Films of 
the time and field diaries portray the Tirailleurs intermingling with other French soldiers 
in football matches,
125
 as well as engaging in bartering items such as pocket knives.
126
 
However, according to Joe Lunn, these contacts varied according to the knowledge of 
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French on the Tirailleurs’ side, and also “close attachments with Europeans in Senegalese 
units were the exception rather than the rule.”127 
 On the side of the French population, reactions were also varied. In general, 
according to Lunn, French citizens were grateful for the contribution of Africans to 
victory. News of French victories where the Tirailleurs had played a part spread among 
the population and Africans were greeted as heroes. Other Tirailleurs also came into 
contact with French women and some entered into romantic relationships with them. 
However, racism was quite common. Tirailleurs were also discriminated against in bars 
and pubs, as well as by their own officers, who still viewed them as colonial subjects. 
Furthemore, the image of the Tirailleurs was still largely paternalistic, as evidenced by 
the infamous “Banania” cereal. The product in question depicted a smiling Tirailleur 
advertising the cereal by saying “Y a bon Banania!” a common stereotype of the pidgin 
French spoken by the Tirailleurs.   
The testimony of Lucie Cousturier, a French writer and painter in southern France, 
is also a valuable source for the daily life of the Tirailleurs among the French population. 
When the Tirailleurs were stationed in Fréjus for the winter of 1916, Cousturier’s home 
was situated close to the winter camps. Initially, influenced by French colonial 
propaganda of the time, Cousturier expressed the fears of civilians, particularly women: 
“after the devastation of the forest, the drabness of their barracks […] it was the 
drunkenness, the robbery, the rape and the epidemics that we blamed on them. The 
farmer girls wept-‘What will become of us […] we will not be able to let our little girls 
walk on the trails, amidst these savages. We ourselves will not dare to go out alone, to 
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gather herbs or lumber. Think! If we were to be caught by these gorillas.’”128 However, 
she began to gradually interact with the Tirailleurs during their walks across the 
countryside. She also depicts the Tirailleurs as curious, when they stopped by her house 
to look at the rabbits she kept, and shy, but kind.
129
 She was also saddened by the fact that 
the Tirailleurs were mocked by the French for their language skills. “[The French they 
teach us] is only for tirailleurs, they recognize sadly. Another one of my pupils, more 
spiteful, assured that ‘those are words found by the French to mock the Senegalese.’”130 
Thus, she decided to improve their French and even visited some of them later on in 
Senegal.  
In the case of Germany, a similar analysis poses additional obstacles. Having lost 
its colonies in 1919, Germany’s links with its former colonies were far more tenuous than 
those of France or Great Britain, and, as mentioned above, interest in the colonies waned 
during and after World War II. Serious field studies, such as those conducted by Lunn or 
Deroux, are also infrequent and testimonies of surviving askari are scarce and incomplete. 
Nonetheless, archival sources do provide some interesting contrasts to the experience of 
the Tirailleurs. First of all, economic motivations were important for the askari. The 
wages in the Schutztruppe were higher than an African would normally receive, and 
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Germans hoped to make a “native elite” out of the askari.131Children of askari would also 
follow their fathers into the Schutztruppe, as will be explained later on.  
Prestige was another reason connected to the latter. Von Lettow-Vorbeck 
mentioned that after the German victory at Tanga, the news spread “from tribe to tribe” 
and “all the best young men wanted to become Askari, and a belief in their troop’s 
strength and command awoke.”132 
On the one hand, some Schutztruppe members developed close relationships with 
their commanders. For example, Selemani Bin Ali, a porter in the service of a certain 
Oberleutnant Spalding served his commanding officer for four and half years. During that 
time he developed a close relationship with Spalding, whom he openly revered. 
According to Bin Ali, “My Lieutenant feared neither bullet nor enemy.133” From the 
testimony, it is clear that Spalding and Bin Ali communicated in both Swahili and 
German. After the death of Spalding in battle, Bin Ali expressed sadness at the loss of his 
“master” and fulfilled his last wishes by sending a letter to the lieutenant’s 
family.
134
Since the testimony was found among field journals of the Schutztruppe, it is 
possible that it idealizes the loyalty of the porter to his officer, but it also indicates, 
among other testimonies, the importance of learning Swahili by German officers, another 
way in which the latter had to adapt to African conditions. Another testimony was 
collected by a German traveller named Hans Alexander Winkler, who allegedly met a 
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blind, unnamed askari veteran in Aswan, Egypt. The veteran showed Winkler his battle 
scars, recalled his former officers, particularly von Lettow-Vorbeck, and could still speak 
some German and remember marching orders, which he performed “with a glimmer in 
his face,”135 according to Winkler.  
Regarding the impact of Africans in Germany, racism and limited acceptance 
were both present in the case of the askari. The few that managed to travel to Germany 
joined a small minority of Afro-Germans. As in France, the image of Africans in 
Germany was characterized by racism. The famous “Völkerschau,” or “people shows” 
were essentially living exhibits of Africans in their “traditional” environment. As in 
France, advertisements depicted the askari as ignorant, particularly emphasizing the 
limited language knowledge of Africans. Like the example of Banania, the Fürstenberg 
beer company advertised its products showing a smiling askari accompanied by the 
words “he can only speak three words in German: Lettoff-Vorbeck, Folkswagen, 
Fürstenberg”136(note the purposely misspelled name of Lettow-Vorbeck and the two 
other brands to emphasize the linguistic incompetence of Africans).   
As with Lucie Cousturier, one of the most complete testimonies available for an 
askari veteran is that of Mahjub bin Adam Mohamed, also known as Bayume 
Mohamed.
137
His father, Adam Mohamed, was part of the first generation of askari, and 
was already a veteran by 1914. Mahjub was allowed to attend government schools in East 
Africa and developed particularly good reading and writing skills in German. Upon the 
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outbreak of the war, he enlisted in the Schutztruppe at age 10 and survived the East 
African campaign, although his father died during the final stage of the war. According to 
Marianne Bechhaus-Gerst, even at this young age, Mahjub had a strong desire to visit 
Germany. When talking to Lettow-Vorbeck, “he expressed his desire to travel to Uleija 
(Europe) and said: ‘Then the Kaiser will say to me ‘Good day, my son’ and will take me 
to the Empress, who will greet me ‘Good day, my child’ and give me cake […].”138 
Mahjub’s life after the war testifies to the harsh reality of askari veterans as well as Afro-
Germans in Weimar Germany. In a similar way to the Tirailleurs, full German citizenship 
eluded most Afro-Germans, but, unlike France, Germany lost all of its colonies after 
1919. Therefore, the majority of Afro-Germans remained in a legal limbo: no longer were 
they colonial subjects and neither did they receive citizenship. Rather, they were 
classified as “Unmittelbarer Reichsangehöriger” or “Deutscher Schutzbefohlener,” two 
ambiguous terms that can roughly be translated as “wards of the state.”   
In effect, German authorities were reluctant to accept people who were once 
colonial subjects as equals.
139
 Therefore, most jobs available to Africans in Germany 
were limited to menial tasks such as those of cooks and kitchen helpers.
140
 Other 
possibilities included the “Völkerschau,” a spectacle designed to portray “authentic” 
Africans and their customs. Others, such as Mahjub, took part in numerous propaganda 
films of the era that glorified the Schutztruppe and the war in East Africa. They also 
faced the racism of the era, but in the case of Mahjub and other former askari, they 
struggled to reclaim their place as proud German soldiers,. Eventually, Mahjub was able 
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to find a teaching post as a Swahili language instructor at the Orientalisches Seminar in 
Berlin. The teaching of Swahili had in fact been an important part of German colonialism. 
As described above, some officers in the Schutztruppe spoke it fluently enough to 
communicate with their troops. But after the establishment of the National Socialist 
regime in 1933, Mahjub was fired from his position and he found less and less 
employment opportunities. Rather than submit to the racial ideology of the Third Reich, 
Mahjub fought for the recognition of his actions as an askari, but was unsuccessful. He 
eventually married a German woman, but was sentenced to a concentration camp at 
Sachsenhausen and died in 1945.   
Once again, the testimony of the commanders is crucial. Karl Heidtmann, a 
Schutztruppe officer, described in great detail the daily interaction between the askari and 
the Germans. He made interesting observations on the eating habits of the askari of 
Wahehe ethnicity, remarking that “without bananas the Waheia (sic) cannot live at all.”141 
He also described the burial customs of the askari, which included animistic elements. 
Furthermore, the latter did not hesitate to chastise Heidtmann after he “disturbed the dead” 
by taking two skeletons for study. When Heidtmann was attacked by a swarm of bees, the 
askari interpreted it as a sign of a devil they called “Scheidani,”angered by Heidtmann’s 
sacrilege and reprimanded him after mocking his ignorance.
142
 Finally, he scolded them 
in turn when the askari were roused in the middle of the night by a “huge shadow,” which 
turned out to be a large rock.
143
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3.4 Colonial troops in postwar France and Germany 
 
The Tirailleurs Sénégalais continued to play a valuable role in the French armed 
forces until the beginning of decolonization in the 1960’s. Having suffered terribly during 
the German offensive in 1940, African units rallied behind de Gaulle’s Free French 
forces and contributed to the liberation of France. Thereafter they served to quell unrest 
in France’s colonies, particularly in Algeria and French Indochina. Therefore, French 
propaganda, as expressed in memorials and monuments tended to emphasize the loyalty 
and devotion of Africans to France. 
144
However, there were already signs of discontent 
with this official government stance. The massacre of mutinous Tirailleurs at Thiaroye in 
1944 by French troops had already highlighted the blatant contradiction between rhetoric 
and reality, but the treatment of Tirailleur veterans also reminded them of their status as 
inferior troops. The issue of pensions was particularly controversial in the postwar era. 
Unlike their French comrades, African veterans saw their pensions “frozen” at the 
currency rate that existed at the time of African independence, regardless of inflation, 
which led to a substantial reduction of the latter’s pensions. Only in 2002 did the French 
government include in its budget some “corrective measures” designed to adjust African 
veterans’ pensions to better reflect the current economic situation of their country of 
residence.
145
 
In Germany, the narrative that emphasizes the positive aspects of German 
colonialism has been maintained in a number of different ways. Throughout the Cold 
War, German economic and technical aid to Africa was contingent on the political 
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alignment of the country in question. According to Sandra Maß, West Germans feared the 
image of communist-oriented Africans, which were supported by East Germany. Against 
this image of the communist African, the West German government promoted instead the 
image of the loyal askari who had fought a “chivalrous war” (ritterlichen Krieg) in East 
Africa, also in contrast to the horrors of the Second World War.
146
Consequently, West 
German aid was directed to countries not aligned with the Communist bloc. Hans Georg 
Steltzer, a former West German ambassador to Africa in the 1980’s, wrote in his memoirs 
that he wanted to understand German colonialism in its context and in an objective 
manner, and not just focus on the negative, as many postwar German historians had 
done.
147
Steltzer travelled through the former German colonies and delighted himself in 
finding traces of the German presence. In Togo, for instance, he found an old water pump 
that still worked. In Tanzania, Steltzer met former askari, who still spoke German and 
were “proud and self-confident,”148and in Cameroon he found that school textbooks 
praised German achievements.  
In recent years, the legacy of the askari has surfaced once again in the 
construction of the unofficially-named Tansaniapark in Hamburg. Formerly a National 
Socialist monument to the role of the Schutztruppe, the monument depicted a column of 
askari led by a German officer, as well as a company of African porters led in turn by an 
askari. Statues of other representatives of German colonialism such as Lothar von Trotha, 
the German officer who brutally suppressed the Herero uprising, were also a part of the 
memorial. After the war, the memorial became part of an army barracks. In 2002, the 
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Hamburg municipal government attempted to reopen the memorial in an attempt to 
emphasize cooperation between Germany and Tanzania. Tentatively named 
Tansaniapark, the reopening of the memorial stirred heavy controversy in the German 
press. The Hamburger Morgenpost accused the Hamburg authorities of attempting to 
whitewash the cruelties of German colonialism,
149
 while activists demonstrated in front 
of the memorial and named it instead “Mohammed Hussein Bayume Park,” in honor of 
Mahjub and other victims of racism, colonialism and violence.
150
To this day, the park 
remains closed to visitors and there has been little promotion of the location as a tourist 
site. 
Conclusion 
 
Beyond the obvious geographical difference, the utilization of Africans by the 
French and the Germans presents some important differences, as well as some remarkable 
similarities. First and foremost, the scope of the use of the Tirailleurs Senegalais evolved 
from an experiment of limited numbers to the establishment of a force that was 
eventually deployed to quell colonial uprisings throughout the 20
th
 century. The 
Tirailleurs fought in Algeria and in Indochina, and became an important part of the armed 
forces of the newly independent African countries. On the German side, the askari 
remained a mostly symbolical presence and played a marginal role in the politics of 
independent Africa. They were never viewed as a large-scale force, and the loss of 
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Germany’s colonies precluded any further development of the askari. Even so, it is 
possible to speculate, as Michael Pesek has done, that the askari were becoming an 
“African elite” due to their relatively high wages they enjoyed. In both cases, however, 
the Tirailleurs and the askari were feared among African civilians, since they were 
employed to suppress native uprisings.  
 Nonetheless, both Germany and France shared similar practices concerning 
recruitment. First of all, and consistent with racial theories of the time, the selection 
process was based on racial hierarchies, wherein some ethnic groups were favoured over 
others due to their “warlike” qualities. Second, despite the fact that the armed forces are 
supposed to be a homogenizing force in modern states, both German and French 
authorities had to make concessions and accommodations to ensure the adequate 
performance of their native troops. The French built mosques and winter camps for the 
Africans, while Germans allowed the Askari to keep their polygamous customs, provided 
religious holidays and respected tribal hierarchies.  
There seems to be a consensus, on the other hand, on the combat prowess of 
Africans, despite accusations to the contrary during the war. Thus, despite centuries of 
racism, Africans were recognized for their value, at least in combat, and praised by their 
commanders and the press at home. However, it is also clear that in both cases the role of 
native troops proved devastating for African civilians. Government officials in the 
colonial capitals dictated their policies with little regard for Africans. In the case of the 
Tirailleurs, conscription ignored the realities of African demographics and even 
contradicted colonial authorities, who were anxious to avoid a war and to maintain the 
colonial economy running. In East Africa, pillage and devastation followed the 
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Schutztruppe, and the war worsened the precarious economic situation of the colony. In 
effect, military considerations took precedence over civilian ones. Both Mangin and von 
Lettow-Vorbeck managed to impose their will over their critics and to override their 
civilian counterparts. Mangin’s force noire and von Lettow-Vorbeck’s aggressive tactics 
eventually won the day.  
Therefore, despite the accusations of “good” and “bad” forms of colonialism, it is 
interesting to note the similar policies adopted by both colonial regimes. In effect, 
German colonialism remains largely unmentioned in colonial histories. J.D. Fage 
mentions some of its positive developments, but, aside from German authors, studies of 
German colonialism focus mostly on the brutality of the Herero and Namaqua genocides 
or on the loss of colonies as a factor in German resentment after the war. But from the 
“scientific” approach to recruitment to the everyday racism prevalent in the colonial 
metropolis, the present study highlights significant similarities between two forms of 
colonialism that saw themselves as polar opposites and tried to discredit each other 
throughout their existence. It also evidences the strong influence of the colonial lobby 
and the military, which were both able to prevail over parliamentary opposition. This also 
reflects two societies still dominated by a strong central government prior to and during 
World War I, since in both cases the military was in effective control during the war. 
Also, the image of the African was one created and disseminated by Europeans, 
simplified and almost cartoonish at times. Thus, some common elements emerge: 
Africans were brave, instinctive and stubborn, good fighters but intellectually inferior.  
Furthermore, the inclusion of primary sources on the African side enables a richer 
picture when compared to the traditional point of view that centers almost exclusively on 
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military tactics. The testimonies of the askari and the tirailleurs reveal complex 
motivations enlisting, as well as conflicting emotions regarding their officers. While the 
amount of sources on the German side are certainly scarce, the story of Mahjub and the 
experiences of Captain Charles N’Tchoréré provide valuable insight on the effects of 
colonial propaganda and assimilation. Both genuinely believed in the cause they fought 
for, and demanded to be treated according to their rank.   
So what was the importance of the role of Africans in the First World War? For 
the first time, the war brought greater numbers of Africans into contact with European 
society. In the heat of battle, Europeans came to respect their African counterparts, at 
least as fellow soldiers. Von Lettow-Vorbeck spoke of “us Africans” in the concluding 
words to his memoirs and German journalists praised the askari in contrast to the 
“traitorous” Kiel sailors. In France, the memory of the Tirailleurs endures to this day. 
Furthermore, Africans also interacted with the population, despite both governments’ 
attempts to limit such contact, and, in some cases, they were able to overcome the racial 
prejudice of their time by integrating into European society. This thesis highlights how 
necessity led Europeans to enlist Africans in their armies, despite the colonial divide, and 
the outcome of such uncommon interaction. 
Some possible pathways to further research could no doubt include other colonial 
powers such as Great Britain and Portugal. As mentioned before, some authors such as 
Ross Anderson, Eric Deroo and Michael Pesek have attempted comparative analyses of 
native troops, but only Pesek goes beyond the military aspects to analyze the recruitment 
practices of the British in East Africa. However, in the case of the British the analysis 
would also have to emphasize the use of the Indian army in Europe, which was limited. 
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The present study has also only briefly touched on the cultural impact of the Askari and 
the Tirailleurs in Europe. Numerous other works also analyze the influence of colonial 
policies in art and music. In the case of Germany, during the Weimar era, black Africans 
became an important subject for painters and musicians, and the Tirailleurs were 
important in the literary arts, such as the works of Léopold Sédar Senghor and Aimé 
Césaire. The situation of African immigrants in contemporary Europe could also shed 
light on the influence of colonialism. 
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